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Until the late 1960s, the World Bank presented itself as an institution devoted to 
sound and directly productive project loans. Yet, during its very early years, some 
discussions developed inside the Bank regarding the possibility of issuing different 
types of loans, namely loans which – albeit sound – were aimed at tackling social 
issues («social loans»), or not directly project-related needs for foreign currencies 
(«impact loans»). This paper analyzes the housing issue as a good case in point. The 
analysis reveals that the Bank was unwilling to lend for housing programs not because 
these were not sound – in fact, they were – but because they appeared to be too social-
biased and not directly linked to productive investment projects, such as dams, power 
stations, and railroads. This early decision had a significant impact on the subsequent 
development of the Bank’s view of policy making. In fact, it was not until the late 
1960s that the Bank began to take social issues into consideration, rather late as 
opposed to other multilateral institutions.  
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  11. Introduction 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – 
since its beginnings known as the World Bank – was instituted at the 
1944 Bretton Woods Conference with the principal purpose of aiding 
European reconstruction after World War II. The abrupt deterioration 
of international relations, the onset of the Cold War and the 
concomitant direct intervention by the US in European reconstruction 
with the Marshall Plan, made the World Bank loans to European 
countries redundant – in fact useless – principally because of the much 
greater magnitude of the US commitment: while the Bank’s loans in 
1947 totalled less than half a million dollars, the Marshall Plan brought 
to Europe around four billions dollars per year (Kapur et al. 1997). 
The World Bank thus switched – much earlier than expected – to its 
second mission: promoting the development of backward member 
countries. As the World Bank’s President John McCloy stated at a 
November 1947 meeting of the Bank’s Executive Directors: «I think 
we are going to be driven into a very different field sooner than I 
thought, into the development field»
1. The problem was that there were 
no experts on development issues in the US or in Europe at that time, 
let alone in more backward countries: the lack of interest in such 
matters on the part of academia, and the virtual non-existence of most 
backward countries in the late 1940s – they were still dominions or 
colonies and had been studied only in respect to the metropolitan 
economies (Meier and Seers 1984) – meant that development issues 
were unknown terrain. 
Throughout 1948 and part of 1949 the Bank almost entirely ceased 
issuing loans, and its personnel and officials undertook an intense 
programme of study and missions to backward member countries in 
order to collect data and information. 
Recollections of those years – also by the Bank’s officials who took 
part in those events (Knapp 1975; Sommers 1989) – give rather cursory 
treatment to this transitional period, concentrating on the result of the 
transition itself: the Bank as an institution devoted to strictly productive 
project loans. 
Yet the transitional period itself is worth analysing. Leonard Rist – 
at that time the head of the Economic Department – pointed out many 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Kapur et al. 1997, p. 83. 
  2years later that the Bank’s policy «was not formulated. It was formed. 
It evolved. It resulted from events. And it changed with different loans. 
[…] Policy formulation have been extremely rare» (Rist 1961, p. 47). It 
is thus interesting to examine the internal debate whereby these policies 
were formed and to determine whether there were alternative policies 
which in fact lost out in the confrontation. As will become evident, 
alternative policies were explicitly discussed at the Bank, but they were 
set aside for a variety of reasons. The modus operandi which emerged 
conditioned the subsequent behaviour of the Bank. 
Analyzing such a complex issue in its entirety would be beyond the 
scope of this paper. It therefore presents a preliminary survey of some 
of the World Bank’s documents from those years which testifies to the 
presence of proposals which were not implemented during the long 
Black presidency
2 and explains why this happened. These documents 
concern the “housing question”. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section will discuss the 
Bank’s first encounter with housing and urban development issues. 
Section 3 will review the Bank’s internal reflections on these issues and 
their eventual practical outcomes. Finally, Section 4 will consider the 
usefulness of focusing on the early years of an institution’s life for 
understanding of its subsequent path of development. 
 
2. The housing issue at the World Bank 
The idea that the World Bank would offer loans for urban development 
and housing arose within the Bank itself. In fact, it was the 
International Labour Organization which first sponsored the issue. 
ILO’s Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee had 
met for its Second Session in Rome from March 16 to March 25, 1949. 
On that occasion, the Italian employers’ delegate
3 – Mr. Gadola – 
suggested that the ILO investigate the possibility of establishing a 
completely new institution – the International Institute for Building 
Loans – under the control of the two Bretton Woods institutions, IBRD 
                                                 
2 Eugene R. Black, former the Bank’s US Executive Director under McCloy’s 
presidency, became the Bank’s third president in 1949, holding that position until 
1963. 
3 With the support of the French and the Italian Governments’ delegates – Messrs. 
Guerard and Visentini respectively. 
  3and the IMF. According to a subcommittee’s minutes, «the function of 
the proposed institute would be to collect private savings by the issue 
of bonds in countries where such savings exist, with a view to making 
mortgage loans for housing construction, especially for the lower-
income groups» (ILO 1949a, p. 9). The main purpose of this proposal 
was to sustain and stabilise employment, firstly by stimulating a typical 
labour-demanding activity, and secondly by promoting the better 
distribution of labour among countries. As regards this latter point, it 
was stressed that the project would favour migration from countries 
with surpluses of population to those with deficits
4 (ILO 1949a, p. 10). 
The Resolution was adopted on 25 March, and the ILO Governing 
Body was invited to contact IBRD (ILO 1949c). This it did one month 
after Eugene R. Black, formerly the Bank’s US Executive Director, had 
become the third IBRD President
5. The matter was thus immediately 
passed to the Economic Department for preliminary examination. 
The Economic Department, under the direction of Leonard Rist, 
discussed two separate matters: (i) whether housing could be 
considered a sufficiently “productive” project, as required by the 
Bank’s Articles of Agreement
6, and (ii) whether the Bank could 
contribute with loans, which would principally be in US currency, to 
projects whose outlays would principally be in local currency, hence 
financing only “indirectly” needed foreign currency
7. 
                                                 
4 Government delegates from East-European countries opposed the proposal, thus 
provoking a split among trade-unions’ delegates: those representing Communist 
trade-unions opposed the proposal or abstained, while those representing Catholic or 
otherwise «Atlantic seaboard» trade-unions – this being the expression used by the 
Belgian Workers’ delegate, Mr. Smets (ILO 1949a, p. 6) – were in favour (ILO 
1949b). In the Italian case, for example, the delegate for the General Italian 
Confederation of Labour (the majority of whose officials and members voted for the 
Communist party) – Mr. Agostini – opposed not only the proposal but the whole 
report, while the delegate for the Free Federation of Italian Workers (with a majority 
of Catholic members) – Mr. De Caterini – approved the report and the proposal. 
5 David A. Morse to Eugene R. Black, 12 August  1949, Housing and Urban 
Development vol. 1, Central Files, Fonds 2, World Bank Group Archives. 
6 Article I, (i). 
7 Svend Andersen, Economic Department, General Studies, “An International 
Institute for Building Loans”, 26 August  1949, Housing and Urban Development vol. 
1, Central Files, Fonds 2, World Bank Group Archives. 
  4As for the first issue, the answer was quite clear: definitely it would 
not be the case for every country, «but no doubt, there are areas where 
the housing shortage seriously hampers the development of new 
resources and industries, so that financing of new houses would in 
those areas be directly productive even within a narrow understanding 
of that term»
8. 
As for the second point, the analysis was more complicated, not least 
because it was impossible to understand – at that very preliminary stage 
of communication – what possibilities were being considered by the 
ILO. The Bank focused on three: (i) a new Institute selling bonds which 
would be formally guaranteed by the IBRD, (ii) a new Institute selling 
bonds, with the Bank guaranteeing not the bonds themselves, but the 
monetary policy of the government hosting the building investment, 
and (iii) a new Institute, with the Bank simply acting as a sponsor 
without any formal commitment. 
The most likely possibility was that the Institute for Building Loans 
would sell bonds in the private markets of capital exporting countries 
under guarantees by the IBRD. But the proceeds would then be mostly 
in US currency, which was inconsistent with the requirement that direct 
financing should be given only to housing projects that required mostly 
local currency. It was thus assumed that this extra US currency would 
be added to the general foreign currency resources of the borrowing 
country as a supplement «necessary to absorb the inflationary pressure 
created by increased construction activity»
9. 
Alternatively, the possibility was considered that the Bank’s 
intervention had been asked to persuade potential local investors to buy 
the proposed Institute’s bonds in the local market, offering a guarantee 
by the IBRD against losses due to devaluations of the local currency. 
Of course, the Bank’s direct involvement – and thus its authority and 
control – would «keep the local government in line»
10. 
A less likely possibility considered was that the Bank would 
participate merely by lending its prestige and experience, without any 
formal guarantees on the Institute’s bonds. 




  5Although these three scenarios – and principally the first of them – 
were at odds with the Bank’s previous loan policy, which had 
principally consisted of directly needed foreign currency for 
reconstruction programs, the possibility of loans for “indirectly” needed 
foreign currency was explicitly envisaged by the Articles of 
Agreement
11. The Economic Department thus advised that the matter 
should be investigated further, asking the ILO to specify the nature of 
the involvement required of the Bank
12. 
 
3. The World Bank and the housing Issue 
Bank’s disengagement 
Contacts between the ILO and the Bank continued for a while, but the 
Institute for Building Loans never came into being. This was partly due 
to conflicts within the ILO itself, principally among country 
representatives on the one side, and the internal technical staff on the 
other
13. The ILO staff, in fact, was highly sceptical that such a huge 
new institution was feasible, or that it could find resources with which 
to finance housing projects, or that the Bank could sponsor it on the 
basis of the ILO Committee’s resolution. 
  The country representatives, by contrast, expressed the need of 
many governments to cope with reconstruction or social problems, or 
both, and saw a new institution headed by the IBRD as a means to 
channel resources into the housing sector. The “housing shortage” was 
a widely discussed problem, and many proposals for programs or 
institutions to finance housing were put forward at least until the mid-
1950s
14. 
                                                 
11 Article IV, Section 3 (c). 
12 Svend Andersen to Leonard B. Rist, “ILO – Proposal for an International Institute 
for Building Loans, 25 August  1949, Housing and Urban Development vol. 1, 
Central Files, Fonds 2, World Bank Group Archives. 
13 Walter Hill to Robert L. Garner, Report H 105, “Conversation with ILO Staff in 
Geneva Relating to the Suggested Creation, under the Control of IBRD, of an 
International Institute for Building Loans”, Paris, October 17, 1949, Housing and 
Urban Development vol. 1, Central Files, Fonds 2, World Bank Group Archives. 
14 For example an International Loan Bank for Building, by the International 
Federation of Building Trade Employers and Civil Engineering Contractors in 
October 1951; a European Credit Institute for Housing, by the Council of Europe’s 
Consultative Assembly in December 1951; a report by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe on methods and techniques of financing housing in various 
  6The International Bank, for its part, managed to avoid any 
commitment to housing projects
15. As the Bank’s president Eugene 
Black explained to his ILO counterpart, David Morse, it was a strict 
rule of the Bank that loans in foreign currency should be used only to 
finance the cost of imported goods and services, and they could not be 
diverted to the financing of local expenditures
16. A more general rule 
was that the Bank’s loans should be for directly productive purposes. 
As Richard Demuth – then head of the Technical Assistance and 
Liaison Staff Office – put it: «the first test of any project to be financed 
by the Bank is its productivity», and housing’s relation to productivity 
seemed too remote
17. 
Hence, the Bank granted no loans to finance activities in the fields of 
housing, town planning and building materials. Only two loans 
concerned, among other things, building activities. In the case of a 
“reconstruction” loan made to the Netherlands in 1947, some resources 
were used to finance the importing of materials used for housing. In the 
Netherlands, in fact, replacement of workmen’s houses destroyed 
during the war «was a step necessary for the rehabilitation of Dutch 
industries essential to the national economy»
18. In the case of a loan 
made in 1952 to improve Iceland’s agricultural production, some 
resources were used for the construction of farm buildings (IBRD 
1952a). However, since Iceland had to import almost all its building 
materials, this loan was considered consistent with the rule that only the 
foreign exchange requirements of a project could be financed
19. With 
the exception of these two loans, building activities were in practice 
ruled out of consideration by the Bank, except residually, as for 
                                                                                                                     
European countries, which aroused interest in the other two UN regional Economic 
Commissions, namely ECLA and ECAFE; see Ernest Weissmann to Davidson 
Sommers, 9 January 1952, Housing and Urban Development vol. 1, Central Files, 
Fonds 2, World Bank Group Archives. 
15 See, for example, Walter Hill to Leonard B. Rist, January 17, 1951, Housing and 
Urban Development vol. 1, Central Files, Fonds 2, World Bank Group Archives. 
16 Eugene R. Black to David A. Morse, December 13, 1949, Housing and Urban 
Development vol. 1, Central Files, Fonds 2, World Bank Group Archives. 
17 Richard H. Demuth, “Financing of Housing”, May 22, 1952, Housing and Urban 
Development vol. 1, Central Files, Fonds 2, World Bank Group Archives. 
18 A. S. G. Hoar to Jacob L. Crane, April 21, 1952, Housing and Urban Development 
vol. 1, Central Files, Fonds 2, World Bank Group Archives. 
19 Ibid. 
  7example in the case of the settling of a construction camp at the site of 
a dam project. 
 
Internal discussions at the Bank: “impact loans” and “social loans” 
Nevertheless, discussion on the issue had not ceased at the Bank. In 
fact, it concentrated on two different proposals: for so-called “impact 
loans”, and for “social loans”. 
The first internal discussion focused on what the Economic 
Department had already argued regarding the ILO proposal: that  even 
in the case of mainly local currency needs, a hard currency loan (i.e. in 
dollars) could prove useful in tackling balance of payments pressures 
deriving from local expenditures. 
This was what came to be called an “impact loan”: that is, a loan 
made to sustain, not a specific project, but the subsequent (inflationary) 
impact of this project on the entire country’s economy. 
This effect had been fully acknowledged by the Bank’s Fifth Annual 
Report (IBRD 1950). This document discussed at length the possibility 
that local expenditure on labour or domestically produced equipment 
could give rise to increased demand for imported consumer goods or 
raw materials, or in the Report’s terms, to «foreign exchange 
requirements indirectly resulting from expenditures in local currency» 
(IBRD 1950, p. 10). In this case, a loan from the Bank would be 
perfectly legitimate if was intended to tide a country over a period of 
expansion without inflation. 
This analysis was based on ideas arising from the work of Paul 
Rosenstein-Rodan – then a member of the Bank’s Economic 
Department – on the loan application submitted by the Italian 
government to the Bank at the end of 1948 for the development of 
Southern Italy. The Italian government had the means to undertake an 
investment program whose capital equipment would be provided out of 
domestic sources, but it lacked large reserves of foreign currency. In 
that situation – Rosenstein-Rodan predicted – the increased income 
resulting from the investment program would generate increased 
demand. This would either create additional demand for imports or a 
reduced supply for exports. In both cases, the country would be subject 
to inflationary pressure and would need a greater amount of foreign 
currency. Making this additional foreign currency available should be 
the Bank’s task. The loans would thus «finance the impact of an 
  8investment program which the Italian government undertakes» 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1961, p. 14). 
The loan to Italy proved successful, but it was not repeated: «it was 
contrary to many people’s thinking, notably to […] the most 
conservative business thinking in the Bank» (Rosenstein-Rodan 1961, 
p. 13). 
The second discussion, complementary to the first, developed from 
the experience of the first comprehensive survey missions undertaken 
in backward member countries. These missions recognized from first-
hand observation of the social and economic conditions of the countries 
visited that not only directly productive, but even directly social, 
interventions were indispensable for a sustained process of 
development. This process would change sectoral growth rates, the 
structures of demand and supply, and the growth rates of urban and 
rural populations, thus placing the social structure of countries already 
facing profound social hardship under great strain. 
The Cuba mission of 1950, for example, recommended that urgent 
action be taken to greatly increase the supply of drinking water to the 
city of Santiago, which was at risk of humanitarian disaster (IBRD 
1951). The Jamaica mission urged the replacement of almost 30 per 
cent of the houses on the island (IBRD 1952b), while the Nicaragua 
mission opened its final report by declaring that «expenditures to 
improve sanitation, education and public health should, without 
question, be given first priority [for] the development of the Nicaraguan 
economy» (IBRD 1953, p. 22). 
Particularly interesting for this paper is the rehabilitation program 
for the slums of the city of Barranquilla, Colombia, proposed to IBRD 
in 1952 by the former head of the Bank’s 1949 comprehensive survey 
mission to that country – Lauchlin B. Currie, in 1952 economic advisor 
to the Colombian government. 
In the case of Barranquilla, the bulk of the program consisted in a 
housing program with two purposes: to upgrade living conditions in the 
Barranquilla area called the “Zona Negra”, «probably the worst slum in 
Colombia»
20, and to stimulate economic growth through an investment 
                                                 
20 Emilio Toro to Robert L. Garner, April 7, 1953, in Lauchlin Bernard Currie Papers, 
Rare Book, Manuscripts, and Special Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, 
N.C. 
  9program in a sector – building – which could expand largely without 
depressive effects. 
Lauchlin Currie would propose his “Leading Sector” model only in 
the 1970s – significantly proposing building as one such leading sector 
– but it is clear that the mechanism, if not the label, was already 
operative in the Barranquilla housing program. It is thus not 
anachronistic to quote from Currie’s reflections on the building sector 
in his 1974 paper: 
 
The import component is low. The unskilled labour component is 
relatively high. The need it serves is so compelling that in the 
United States and Canada, despite the high level of incomes, “home 
operations” still capture about 30% of disposable income. The stock 
of houses is so large that a relatively small addition should have 
little effects on prices […]. It is true that the stock is not so great in 
a developing country but this is more than offset by the high growth 
rate of urban population and the desirability of replacing extensive 
slum areas. (Currie 1974, p. 7) 
 
Currie was not satisfied by explanations of poverty and the vicious 
circle of poverty in backward countries couched in terms of a general 
“scarcity” of capital, nor by solutions which relied on a general or 
aggregate growth of many sectors such to move the entire economy 
upward. Rather, he proposed removing obstacles to sectors whose 
demand could be estimated as large but latent and which could achieve 
sustained growth «independently of the overall rate of growth of the 
economy» (Currie 1974, p. 6). These two conditions identified a sector 
which could transmit its own independent upward movement to other 
sectors, thus “leading” the economy through a process of sustained 
growth. 
Moreover, this process could be triggered and driven by addressing 
social items on the development agenda as well, for example dwelling 
renewal. In his Colombian economic advice, Lauchlin Currie was 
reviving his pre-war endeavour to reconcile «the humanitarian and 
social aims of the New Deal [with] sound economics».
21 
                                                 
21 Lauchlin B. Currie to Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Memorandum on Full Employment”, 
March 18, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York, 
quoted in Barber (1996, p. 130). This is the principal reason why Lauchlin Currie has 
been considered a pioneer by many of the economists who proposed, in the 1960s-
  10 
The Bank’s rejection  of “impact” and “social” loans 
However, neither the concept of “impact loan”, nor the possibility of 
matching social aims with sound economics, changed the Bank’s 
position. The social prescriptions advanced by the missions to Cuba, 
Jamaica, and Nicaragua were ignored by the Bank, nor did it participate 
in the Barranquilla program. 
This was for three main reasons. The first was that it was necessary 
to convince U.S. investors that the Bank was creditworthy, and that its 
bonds – its main source of funds – were sound (Oliver 1995). This was 
an exogenous and compelling reason that goes some way towards 
explaining the propensity to manage the institution cautiously. Yet, it is 
not sufficient to explain why possibly sound investments were avoided 
(housing, for example), and more in general why no consideration was 
made of solutions that, within the frame of a general “soundness 
principle”, could tackle both economic and social issues. 
To gain a broader view one must also consider – and this is the 
second reason, closely linked to the first – that the top management of 
the Bank – the Presidents and their closest staff – came from the 
financial community of Wall Street (Kraske 1996), and it was in the 
culture and in the interests of their social milieu to conceive the Bank 
as strictly a bank: that is, a sound conservative institution whose 
investments should «yield the greatest and quickest increase in output 
and productivity»
22. 
The third reason was that the first development loans proved very 
successful in that they were completely repaid. Hence there was no 
reason, from the point of view of conservative bankers at least, to 
change policy. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
                                                                                                                     
1970s, a shift from the idea of development as maximization of economic growth to 
the inclusion of social issues, such as basic needs or redistribution policies. Paul 
Streeten, editor of World Development, asked Currie to write a paper on his 
pioneering ideas (Currie 1978). 
22 Robert L. Garner to Emilio Toro, April 21, 1953, in Lauchlin Bernard Currie 
Papers, Rare Book, Manuscripts, and Special Collections Library, Duke University, 
Durham, N.C. 
  11This brief historical reconstruction has shown that the World Bank 
concerned itself with the housing problem from very early on in its 
history. It was involved in analysis of the issue conducted both 
externally by the ILO Committee and internally by the Economic 
Department, which devised a loan pattern that would include housing 
loans, and by the missions to backward countries, which proposed that 
traditionally bankable loans should be linked with social loans. 
The Bank did not take up those proposals, however, and decided to 
grant loans only for directly productive purposes. Since this policy 
yielded high returns, it seems coherent to propose a functionalist 
explanation for what happened: there was a well-defined situation with 
certain constraints (fund raising, for example), and the institution 
developed a perfectly efficient solution for it. 
The paper has provided evidence that this kind of explanation is due 
to a perspective mistake. In actual fact, there was more than one option, 
and none of them was intrinsically in conflict with the others. For 
reasons that were not exclusively economic, the institution opted for 
one particular solution to the exclusion of the others, thus establishing a 
pattern that would be pursued long afterwards. 
These considerations match Mark Granovetter’s thesis that 
organizational forms acquire a particular shape for reasons that are not 
only rational – Granovetter stresses networks – and that their further 
evolution depends on that particular shape (Granovetter 1990). It is for 
this reason that the formative periods of institutions – and by extension 
their turning points – are so important: because it is exactly then that 
there arises from an uncertain situation a shape that progressively 
acquires solidity and becomes less subject to mutations, influencing the 
subsequent institutional development and thus determining a sort of 
institutional path dependence – in the words of Paul David, the 
«persisting consequences of some aleatory and transient conditions that 
prevailed early in the history of the process» (David 1994, p. 208). 
If the analytical importance of the uncertainty of the formative 
period is accepted, the only way to understand subsequent 
developments is to resort to historical reconstruction. It was for this 
reason that Albert O. Hirschman commended in 1980 the “thick 
description” method, or the histoire événementielle, as approaches 
particularly sensitive to history’s «might have beens» (Hirschman 
1980, p. 141). By this he meant not the obvious considerations on fate 
  12or accident, though these are sometimes important, but ways to 
maintain the focus on the «degrees of freedom» – as Hirschman (1980, 
p. 141) put it – or on the different options that are almost always 
present in the history of societies. 
History is necessary to understand processes of change and 
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